Chemical Plant Disaster Scenario - Emergency Response Plan

Chemical Plant Disaster Scenario

                        Combinations of drought and flood scenario towards this chemical plant.

Accident Event

 
1^st Event

1.       17 Sept 2016 @ 9.45 am

2.       Ferric acid tank (ferric chloride) collapsed releasing a large amount of ferric chloride.

3.       This collapsed tank fell onto sodium hypochlorite transfer pipe system causing simultaneously mixing of these chemicals which produced a lethal and hazardous chlorine gas.

4.       ERP triggered – Fast response from the Facilities ERT and BOMBA succeeded in neutralizing the chlorine gas; from 3 PPM @ 12 pm to 0.5 PPM @ 1 PM and to 0 PPM @ 3 PM.

5.       However, one factory ERT team member and four firemen were given outpatient treatment.

6.       Stinging odour smelled by the nearby residents causing itchy throats, severe cough and accompanied by burning sensation in their throats.
 
2^nd Event

1.       Flash flood caused by overflooded river nearby, results from heavy rain upstream.

2.       The following day, 18 Sept 2016 @ 2 am, heavy rain pouring down onto the facilities and Bukit Merah area causing sudden flash flood, where the river nearby was overflowed.

3.       The debris from the earlier event caused another disastrous event.

4.       Strong overflow current washed away the debris and hit the nearby ferric acid tank and sodium hypochlorite tank causing sudden mix producing lethal and hazardous chlorine gas.

5.       However, the mixing produced diluted hydrochloric acid which were hazardous and harmful to the facilities, personnel and environment.

Emergency Response Scenario

1^st Event

Date      : 17 Sept 2016

Time      : 9.45 am

 

1.       9.50 am                - Long evacuation alarm sounded

2.       9.50 am                - Emergency Response Plan triggered and evacuation commences.

3.       9.55 am                - ERT mobilize and lead by Facility General Manager which is also the       

                               Incident Commander

- IC check on Emergency Management Team

            - HSE coordinates ERT movement, evacuation, scriber, brief IC

            - Liaison responsible for communications with public, BOMBA, 

                 HAZMAT, POLICE and inter department

-  Operation responsible for facility emergency shutdown sequence.

- HR responsible for headcount, family affairs

- Security responsible for all security matters

4.       9.56 am                - Facility evacuated

5.       9.58 am                - ERT try to contain the release by setting up water curtain.

6.       9.58 am                - IC calls Operation to execute emergency shutdown for the whole facility through designated stages.

7.       9.59 am                - IC contacts BOMBA, HAZMAT and POLICE for further assistance.

8.       10.00 am             - Setting up Incident Command Centre.

9.       10.05 am             - Release of Chlorine Gas escalates.

10.   10.06 am             -BOMBA and HAZMAT to the scene

11.   10.10 am             - Briefing to BOMBA, HAZMAT and Police on the current situation.

12.   10.15 am             - Police starts controlling access and egress

13.   10.15 am             - BOMBA and HAZMAT setting up perimeter water curtain, by using river

                               water and neutralizing the chlorine gas concurrently.

14.   10.20 am             - Large reaction fumes produce whilst in neutralization.

15.   11.00 am             - Still in neutralization mode but it is satisfactorily contained

16.   12.00 pm             - chlorine gas reads at 3 PPM

17.   1.00 pm                - chlorine gas at 0.5 PPM

18.   3.00 pm                - chlorine gas at 0 PPM

19.   4.00 pm                - Debriefing over the operation

20.   4.30 pm                - Further investigation by ERT, BOMBA and HAZMAT.

 

2^nd Event

Date      : 18 Sept 2016

Time      : 2.00 am

 

1.    2.00 am                - Flash flood from overflow river nearby entering facilities premise.

2.       2.10 am                - Alarm not triggered as the power supply have been cut off due to earlier  

                               event.

3.       2.15 am                - Remaining ERT, BOMBA, HAZMAT and Police are still in the facility. They

  had to move to higher ground which is at the operation building. Seeking 

  for help from BOMBA department and Police.

4.       2.20 am                - Strong current washed away collapsed tank debris and yet hit another

  nearby ferric acid tank and sodium hypochlorite tank causing sudden mix  

  producing lethal and hazardous chlorine gas again. However, the mixing

  produced diluted hydrochloric acid which were hazardous and harmful to

  the facilities, personnel and environment.

5.       2.30 am                - Facility bund wall designed was able to slow down the current and 

  eventually enough to dilute chlorine gas and HCL.

6.       3.00 am                - The flash flood starts to diminish.

7.       3.15 am                - Flash flood stop and water with the remaining HCL is still in the premise as

  the bund wall design was to hold overflow river water. However, the  

  bund wall was not quite high enough to stop the water from entering the

  premise.

8.       3.30 am                - ERT, BOMBA, HAZMAT and Police setting up a new command centre at the

   operation building.

9.       3.45 am                - Mitigation plan commences. Checking the water for HCL concentration.

10.   3.50 am                - Pumping out the remaining water in the premise when the specifications of

  hazardous chemical (HCL) concentration are met.

11.   4.50 am                - Helps from another BOMBA fire brigade and Police arrive.

12.   5.00 am                - Operation debriefing

13.   5.30 am                - Continuing investigation of the 1^st event.